"Total (21 January \u2013 9 July):" . "(Operation Scotland II :)"@en . . . . . . "485"^^ . "Viet Cong" . . . . "345984"^^ . . . . . "the Vietnam War"@en . . . . "Major general Tr\u1EA7n Qu\u00FD Hai"@en . "(Casualties of USAF personnel:)" . "\u041E\u0441\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u041A\u0445\u0435\u0448\u0430\u043D\u0438"@ru . . . . "16.655444444444445 106.72858333333333" . . . "Le si\u00E8ge de Khe Sanh est une bataille de la guerre du Vi\u00EAt Nam qui opposa l'arm\u00E9e am\u00E9ricaine \u00E0 l'Arm\u00E9e populaire vietnamienne et les troupes du Front national de lib\u00E9ration du Sud Vi\u00EAt Nam (Vi\u00EAt Cong). Elle se d\u00E9roula au d\u00E9but de 1968, durant la fameuse offensive du T\u1EBFt. Elle commen\u00E7a le 21 janvier et dura 77 jours. Conclue par une victoire am\u00E9ricaine, elle n'eut cependant pas de r\u00E9elle implication strat\u00E9gique."@fr . . "\u0411\u0438\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u041A\u0435-\u0421\u0430\u043D, \u0430\u0431\u043E \u043E\u0431\u043B\u043E\u0433\u0430 \u041A\u0435-\u0421\u0430\u043D (\u041A\u0435\u0441\u0430\u043D\u0456; \u0430\u043D\u0433\u043B. Battle of Khe Sanh, \u0432'\u0454\u0442. 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Qu\u1EA3ng Tr\u1ECB), \u043D\u0430 \u043F\u0456\u0432\u0434\u0435\u043D\u044C \u0432\u0456\u0434 \u0434\u0435\u043C\u0456\u043B\u0456\u0442\u0430\u0440\u0438\u0437\u043E\u0432\u0430\u043D\u043E\u0457 \u0437\u043E\u043D\u0438 \u0437 \u041F\u0456\u0432\u043D\u0456\u0447\u043D\u0438\u043C \u0412'\u0454\u0442\u043D\u0430\u043C\u043E\u043C. \u041E\u0431\u043B\u043E\u0433\u0430 \u0432\u0456\u0439\u0441\u044C\u043A\u043E\u0432\u043E\u0457 \u0431\u0430\u0437\u0438 \u041A\u0435-\u0421\u0430\u043D \u0441\u0442\u0430\u043B\u0430 \u043E\u0434\u043D\u0456\u0454\u044E \u0437 \u0432\u0438\u0437\u043D\u0430\u0447\u043D\u0438\u0445 \u0431\u0438\u0442\u0432 \u043F\u043E\u0440\u0443\u0447 \u0437 \u0422\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044C\u043A\u0438\u043C \u043D\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043F\u043E\u043C \u0442\u0430 \u043F\u0456\u0434 \u0447\u0430\u0441 \u0432\u0456\u0439\u043D\u0438 \u0443 \u0412'\u0454\u0442\u043D\u0430\u043C\u0456. \u0410\u0440\u043C\u0456\u0457 \u041F\u0456\u0432\u043D\u0456\u0447\u043D\u043E\u0433\u043E \u0412'\u0454\u0442\u043D\u0430\u043C\u0443 \u043D\u0435 \u0432\u0434\u0430\u043B\u043E\u0441\u044C \u0437\u0430\u0445\u043E\u043F\u0438\u0442\u0438 \u0431\u0430\u0437\u0443, \u043E\u0431\u043B\u043E\u0433\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0448\u0438\u043B\u0430\u0441\u044C \u0432\u0456\u0439\u0441\u044C\u043A\u043E\u0432\u0438\u043C \u043F\u0440\u043E\u0432\u0430\u043B\u043E\u043C. \u0417 \u0443\u0440\u0430\u0445\u0443\u0432\u0430\u043D\u043D\u044F\u043C \u0432\u0435\u043B\u0438\u043A\u0438\u0445 \u0432\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442 \u0441\u0443\u043F\u0440\u043E\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043D\u0438\u043A\u0430, \u043E\u0431\u043B\u043E\u0433\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0448\u0438\u043B\u0430\u0441\u044C \u0434\u043B\u044F \u0430\u043C\u0435\u0440\u0438\u043A\u0430\u043D\u0441\u044C\u043A\u043E\u0457 \u0441\u0442\u043E\u0440\u043E\u043D\u0438 \u043F\u0435\u0440\u0435\u043C\u043E\u0433\u043E\u044E. \u0427\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u0434\u0435\u044F\u043A\u0438\u0439 \u0447\u0430\u0441 \u043F\u043E \u0437\u0430\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0448\u0435\u043D\u043D\u044E \u0431\u0438\u0442\u0432\u0438, \u0431\u0430\u0437\u0430 \u0431\u0443\u043B\u0430 \u043F\u043E\u043A\u0438\u043D\u0443\u0442\u0430 \u0442\u0430 \u0437\u0440\u0443\u0439\u043D\u043E\u0432\u0430\u043D\u0430."@uk . . . "Battle of Khe Sanh"@en . . . . . "274"^^ . "1968-07-09"^^ . . "A burning fuel dump after a mortar attack at Khe Sanh"@en . . . . "Operation Arc Light and operation Niagara: U.S. Air Forces" . . . . . . . . "* North Vietnamese Army gained control of the Khe Sanh region after the American withdrawal." . . . "At least 11 marines killed, wounded unknown\n(During aerial resupply:)"@en . "Khe Sanh Combat Base , Qu\u1EA3ng Tr\u1ECB Province, Republic of Vietnam \u2013 UTM Grid XD 852-418"@en . "(Casualties of USAF personnel:)"@en . . "2642"^^ . . . . . "~40,000 in total, in which:\n*Siege at Khe Sanh: ~17,200 \n*Defense at Route 9: ~16,900"@en . . . . . . "274 killed" . "Bataille de Khe Sanh"@fr . . "De Slag om Khe Sanh was een 77 dagen durend beleg, uitgevochten rondom de Mariniersbasis Khe Sanh, nabij de gedemilitariseerde zone tussen Noord- en Zuid-Vietnam. Het was een onderdeel van het Tet-offensief, en was een van de eerste conventionele veldslagen tussen de Vietcong en de Amerikaanse strijdkrachten. Hoewel de slag een Amerikaanse overwinning was, besloot men niet lang na de slag om de marinebasis alsnog te verlaten, waardoor de Vietminh de basis en het omliggend gebied kon bezetten. Na de slag, zou de Vietminh het nooit meer tegen de Amerikanen opnemen in een conventionele veldslag."@nl . . . . . "Unknown"@en . "Slaget vid Khe Sanh var ett slag som utspelade sig i Sydvietnam fr\u00E5n den 21 januari till den 8 april 1968 under Vietnamkriget mellan den Nordvietnamesiska arm\u00E9n (NVA) och amerikanska arm\u00E9n. Den amerikanska basen vid l\u00E5g vid under b\u00F6rjan av kriget mycket n\u00E4ra den nordvietnamesiska och Laotiska gr\u00E4nsen och basens soldater s\u00E4ndes regelbundet ut i strid mot NVA f\u00F6rband l\u00E4ngs med gr\u00E4nsen i de s\u00E5 kallade , i syfte att st\u00F6ra eller stoppa fl\u00F6det av regulj\u00E4ra nordvietnamesiska f\u00F6rband in i Sydvietnam. Under 1967 kunde amerikanerna konstatera truppkoncentrationer runt Khe Sanh, med tv\u00E5 nordvietnamesiska infanteridivisioner och underst\u00F6dsf\u00F6rband (304 och 325C divisionerna, sammanlagt runt 40 000 soldater, varav runt 20 000 ber\u00E4knas ha faktiskt medverkat i de f\u00F6ljande striderna) fanns grupperade inom r\u00E4ckh\u00E5ll f\u00F6r de amerikanska baserna, som pendlade runt 6 000 soldater i styrka, n\u00E4stan alla fr\u00E5n marink\u00E5ren. Situationen f\u00F6r Khe Sanh var sl\u00E5ende lik den tidigare bel\u00E4gringsstriden vid Dien Bien Phu d\u00E4r fransm\u00E4nnen 14 \u00E5r tidigare tillfogades ett nederlag som tvingade dem att l\u00E4mna Indokina. Khe Sanh var en isolerad dal omgiven av kullar och helt beroende av f\u00F6rs\u00F6rjning fr\u00E5n luften, med ol\u00E4ndig terr\u00E4ng som m\u00F6jliggjorde d\u00F6ljandet av mycket stora vietnamesiska styrkor. D\u00E4rmed mycket lik den geografi som finns runt Dien Bien Phu. \u00D6verbef\u00E4lhavaren \u00F6ver de amerikanska styrkorna i Vietnam general William Westmoreland fattade trots det, eller just d\u00E4rf\u00F6r, beslutet att h\u00E5lla Khe Sanh. Han hoppas p\u00E5 att det synbarligen s\u00E5rbara i positionen skulle locka Nordvietnam att erbjuda en st\u00F6rre drabbning, med utsikten att upprepa segern vid Dien Bien Phu och f\u00F6rinta en stor amerikansk styrka. Det var exakt samma motiv som fransm\u00E4nnen haft med sin Base Aero-Terrestre i Dien Bien Phu, d.v.s. att exponera en s\u00E5rbar styrka f\u00F6r att locka till en st\u00F6rre drabbning. Precis som amerikanerna var de \u00F6vertygade om att deras \u00F6verl\u00E4gsna eldkraft och markstridsf\u00F6rband skulle f\u00F6rhindra nederlag och i st\u00E4llet tillfoga nordvietnameserna s\u00E5 sv\u00E5ra f\u00F6rluster att de skulle f\u00E5 sv\u00E5rt att forts\u00E4tta krigf\u00F6ringen. Westmoreland hade studerat Dien Bien Phu och hade tillit till amerikanernas eldkraft, som var m\u00E5nga g\u00E5nger st\u00F6rre \u00E4n den som fransm\u00E4nnen haft till f\u00F6rfogande. Han var ocks\u00E5 personligen \u00F6vertygad om att Nordvietnams \u00F6verbef\u00E4lhavare Vo Nguyen Giap s\u00F6kte efter en upprepning av sin framg\u00E5ng. Giap har sj\u00E4lv aldrig bekr\u00E4ftat att s\u00E5 var fallet. Han har i st\u00E4llet efter\u00E5t h\u00E4vdat att operationerna runt Khe Sanh aldrig haft annat syfte \u00E4n att binda amerikanska f\u00F6rband. N\u00E4r Tet-offensiven drog ig\u00E5ng samtidigt med striderna vid Khe Sanh f\u00F6rblev Westmoreland \u00F6vertygad om att detta var avledningsf\u00F6rs\u00F6k f\u00F6r att f\u00F6rm\u00E5 honom att dra undan trupper fr\u00E5n I Corps omr\u00E5de (norra Sydvietnam) f\u00F6r att g\u00F6ra Ke Sanh mer utsatt. Som redan n\u00E4mnts uppgav Vo Nguyen Giap motsatsen, med f\u00F6rdelen gent emot Westmorelands uttalande att han gjorde dem l\u00E5ngt efter kriget med facit i hand. Enligt samma m\u00F6nster som Dien Bien Phu inleddes striderna med att omkringliggande amerikanska baser angreps, varibland basen Lang Vei f\u00F6ll n\u00E4r nordvietnameserna f\u00F6r f\u00F6rsta g\u00E5ngen under Vietnamkriget anv\u00E4nde pansarfordon i striderna (sovjetiska PT-76). Lang Vei f\u00F6rsvarades av amerikanska specialf\u00F6rband (Green Berets) tillsammans med sydvietnamesiska f\u00F6rband (CIDG i detta fall), vilka utpl\u00E5nades n\u00E4stan helt. D\u00E4refter angreps h\u00F6jderna runt basen i Khe Sanh en efter en, med s\u00E4rskilt intensiva strider runt h\u00F6jderna 861, 881 South, 881 North och 64. Amerikanerna h\u00F6ll samtliga h\u00F6jder men led sv\u00E5ra f\u00F6rluster. Insatsen av eldkraft mot de nordvietnamesiska f\u00F6rbanden var st\u00F6rre \u00E4n n\u00E5got som anv\u00E4nts i krigf\u00F6ring fram till den punkten, \u00F6ver fem ton spr\u00E4ngmedel per vietnamesisk soldat sl\u00E4pptes bara i flygbombningar, vartill kom det amerikanska artilleriet vars styrka var betydande. Trots det uppt\u00E4ckte amerikanerna snart sammanh\u00E4ngande komplex av skyttegravar som omringade hela basen i Ke Sanh. Precis som vid Dien Bien Phu hade vietnameserna lyckats d\u00F6lja sina f\u00F6rband och b\u00F6rjade sakta omge hela basen med ett bel\u00E4grande band av skyttegravar, i vilka de hade skydd mot amerikansk eldkraft och fr\u00E5n vilka de kunde anfalla. Amerikaner som f\u00F6rs\u00F6kte l\u00E4mna basen hamnade i bakh\u00E5ll och f\u00F6rs\u00F6ken att s\u00E4nda stridspatruller m\u00F6tte samma \u00F6de. Basen i Khe Sanh blev isolerad ocks\u00E5 fr\u00E5n h\u00F6jderna runt om basen, d\u00E4r amerikanerna hade posteringar f\u00F6r att skydda basen. Dessa fick f\u00F6rs\u00F6rjas separat per flyg, med v\u00E4xlande framg\u00E5ng. Under hela perioden p\u00E5gick ett oavbrutet regn av artilleri och raketer \u00F6ver basen, liksom prickskytte mot garnisonen. Amerikanerna lyckades aldrig tysta nordvietnamesernas batterier, trots f\u00F6rs\u00F6k med ny radarutrustning, ljudsensorer och flera andra i och f\u00F6r sig framg\u00E5ngsrika experiment. Man uppskattar att 700 000 projektiler av alla slag avfyrades mot basen, vilket \u00E4r 120 per person som befann sig d\u00E4r. Nordvietnameserna lyckades ocks\u00E5 st\u00F6ra f\u00F6rs\u00F6rjningen av basen fr\u00E5n luften. Elden var s\u00E5 intensiv p\u00E5 landningsbanorna att st\u00F6rre flyg som C-130 inte kunde anv\u00E4ndas mer och de mindre planen kunde inte stanna utan fick sl\u00E4ppa last och passagerare rullande i h\u00F6g fart. Amerikanerna fick allt sv\u00E5rare med f\u00F6rn\u00F6denheter och ammunition. Likheterna med Dien Bien Phu var snart s\u00E5 stora att president Johnson engagerade sig personligen dagligen i situationen, l\u00E4t bygga en modell av basen p\u00E5 sitt tj\u00E4nsterum, och f\u00F6rsvarsministern McNamara var s\u00E5 h\u00E5rdf\u00F6rt emot f\u00F6retaget och insisterade p\u00E5 evakuering att han fick avg\u00E5. Amerikansk press rapporterade dagligen om l\u00E4get och Khe Sanh var ocks\u00E5 samtals\u00E4mne i snart sagt alla sammanhang och milj\u00F6er i USA, privat och offentligt. Striderna p\u00E5gick samtidigt som amerikanerna hade problem med att \u00E5terer\u00F6vra staden Hue fr\u00E5n FNL, d\u00E4r gatustriderna ocks\u00E5 rapporterades dagligen i media. Striderna runt Khe Sanh fortsatte in i mars 1968. Nordvietnamesiska f\u00F6rband gjorde stormningar av olika avgr\u00E4nsade delar av basen, som alla slogs tillbaka. Amerikanerna hade sedan januari satt in en kampanj med bombflyg och artilleri f\u00F6r att angripa nordvietnameserna runt Khe Sanh och denna fortsatte med of\u00F6rminskad styrka. Inget \u00E4r k\u00E4nt om effekterna, men nordvietnameserna befann sig praktiskt taget oavbrutet under en bombmatta. Den 1 april inledde USA f\u00F6r att bryta bel\u00E4gringen av Khe Sanh. Operationen lyckades efter ett inledande motst\u00E5nd, varefter de nordvietnamesiska f\u00F6rbanden drog sig tillbaka och f\u00F6rsvann i djungeln. I juli 1968 drog sig amerikanerna bort fr\u00E5n Ke Sanh och f\u00F6rst\u00F6rde basen. Hela regionen f\u00F6ll under nodvietnamesisk kontroll. Det \u00E4r omstritt om striderna vid Khe Sanh var en seger eller ett nederlag f\u00F6r amerikanerna. USA anv\u00E4nde taktiska m\u00E5l f\u00F6r sina operationer och ur det perspektivet hade man hindrat nordvietnameserna fr\u00E5n att uppn\u00E5 ett enda av sina m\u00E5l f\u00F6rutom Lang Vei. Det var en mycket tydlig framg\u00E5ng, precis som den samtidigt p\u00E5g\u00E5ende Tetoffensiven hade slutat p\u00E5 precis samma s\u00E4tt, d.v.s. att nordvietnameserna och Viet Cong misslyckades med att n\u00E5 ett enda taktiskt m\u00E5l. USA hade dock begr\u00E4nsat intresse av geografi och att hindra fienden fr\u00E5n att uppn\u00E5 geografiska taktiska m\u00E5l - som att inta ett visst omr\u00E5de - var av sekund\u00E4rt intresse. Amerikanernas m\u00E5l var f\u00F6rintandet av motst\u00E5ndaren och d\u00E4rf\u00F6r var f\u00F6rluster viktigare f\u00F6r dem \u00E4n platser. Ur det perspektivet betraktade USA vare sig Khe Sanh eller Tetoffensiven som segrar. Man \u00E5tnj\u00F6t en utomordentligt v\u00E4l utbyggd milit\u00E4rsjukv\u00E5rd och en effektiv evakueringskedja, vilket tillsammans med kroppsskydd (v\u00E4star) gjorde att relativt f\u00E5 amerikaner stupade vid Khe Sanh (knappt 1 000 soldater). Men totalt var f\u00F6rlusterna n\u00E4rmare 6 000 amerikanska soldater, inr\u00E4knat de s\u00E5rade vars liv man kunde r\u00E4dda men vars tj\u00E4nstg\u00F6ring var \u00F6ver. Nordvietnams f\u00F6rluster vid Khe Sanh f\u00F6rblev ok\u00E4nda, runt 1 500 kroppar \u00E5terfanns runt basen men amerikanerna ber\u00E4knade att ytterligare 10-14 000 m\u00E5ste ha f\u00F6rlorats i d\u00F6da och skadade. \u00C4ven accepterande den ber\u00E4kningen var f\u00F6rh\u00E5llandet 1:2 i f\u00F6rluster i en strid d\u00E4r en bef\u00E4st och nedgr\u00E4vd f\u00F6rsvarare angrips \u00F6ver \u00F6ppen mark, och h\u00E5ller positionen, inte acceptabelt f\u00F6r USA. Det \u00E4r lika m\u00E5nga som fransm\u00E4nnen f\u00F6rlorade vid Dien Bien Phu i stupade och s\u00E5rade, med f\u00F6rh\u00E5llandet 1:4 mot Vietminhs f\u00F6rluster trots att fransm\u00E4nnen f\u00F6rfogade \u00F6ver mindre \u00E4n en sj\u00E4ttedel av eldkraften som sattes in vid Khe Sanh. I Hue, som man stred om under den samtidiga Tetoffensiven, var f\u00F6rh\u00E5llandet negativt f\u00F6r amerikanerna. Man f\u00F6rlorade fler soldater \u00E4n sina fiender. Amerikanerna skulle aldrig igen efter Khe Sanh erbjuda en st\u00F6rre drabbning och tilliten till eldkraft spelade aldrig igen en avg\u00F6rande roll under Vietnamkriget (j\u00E4mf\u00F6r striderna vid Hamburger Hill fem \u00E5r senare). Ett annat operativt perspektiv som amerikanerna konstaterade \u00E4r att Westmoreland f\u00F6rs\u00F6kte locka sin fiende till angrepp genom att erbjuda honom m\u00F6jligheten att sl\u00E5 ut en amerikansk styrka p\u00E5 6 000 soldater, och till\u00E4t honom att g\u00F6ra just det. Tanken med Khe Sanh som en f\u00E4lla, d\u00E4r nordvietnamesiska f\u00F6rband skulle f\u00F6rintas av eldkraft och amerikanska f\u00F6rband bevaras relativt intakta, var ett uppenbart misslyckande. Nordvietnameserna ledde inte operationer efter taktiska m\u00E5ls\u00E4ttningar. Operationer var avsedda att uppn\u00E5 politiska effekter. Den politiska effekten av Khe Sanh blev stark p\u00E5 den amerikanska hemmaopinionen. I ett l\u00E4ge d\u00E4r befolkningen givits intrycket att kriget var n\u00E4stan \u00F6ver, kom mediabilder fr\u00E5n de h\u00E5rt pressade och bel\u00E4grade soldaterna i Khe Sanh samtidigt som de kunde se hur gerillan angrep amerikanska ambassaden mitt i huvudstaden Saigon, och hur USA helt tappade kontrollen \u00F6ver kejsarstaden Hue och hade stora sv\u00E5righeter med att ta tillbaka den trots att fienden lokalt var illa utrustade gerillaf\u00F6rband utan milit\u00E4r utbildning. Det blev mycket tydligt att kriget inte bara var l\u00E5ngt ifr\u00E5n \u00F6ver - \u00E4ven segern som utlovats tedde sig tvivelaktig. I USA beslutades m\u00E4ngden civila som skulle kallas in till kriget \u00E5r f\u00F6r \u00E5r och amerikanerna blev chockade n\u00E4r man beslutade att kalla in 46 000 pojkar 1968, den st\u00F6rsta kullen dittills under Vietnamkriget och \u00E5terigen vid en tid n\u00E4r man letts att tro att det var mer eller mindre \u00F6ver. Opinionen mot kriget i USA, som redan var etablerad, v\u00E4xte sig i omedelbart samband med Khe Sanh mycket stark och skulle s\u00E5 f\u00F6rbli. Nordvietnam betraktade d\u00E4rmed operationerna som framg\u00E5ngar, \u00E4ven om Vo Nguyen Giap senare uttryckte att priset blev h\u00F6gt och att han hade hoppats p\u00E5 mer. Precis som Westmoreland var han \u00F6vertygad om att USA f\u00F6rlorade sex tusen marinsoldater i en drabbning skulle landet \u00F6verge kriget i Vietnam. De fick b\u00E5da fel, USA fortsatte krigf\u00F6ringen ett decennium till efter Khe Sanh."@sv . . . . "\uCF00\uC0B0 \uC804\uD22C(Battle of Khe Sahn, 1968\uB144 1\uC6D4 21\uC77C ~ 1968\uB144 7\uC6D4 9\uC77C)\uC740 1968\uB144 \uBBF8\uAD6D \uD574\uBCD1\uB300 \uACFC \uBD81\uBCA0\uD2B8\uB0A8 \uAD70\uB300\uAC00 \uC5D0\uC11C \uCE58\uB978 \uC804\uD22C\uC774\uB2E4. \uC81C2\uC758 \uB514\uC5D4\uBE44\uC5D4\uD478 \uC804\uD22C\uB85C \uC720\uBA85\uD558\uC600\uB2E4."@ko . . . . . . . . . . . . "\u6EAA\u751F\u6218\u5F79\uFF08\u8D8A\u5357\u8BED\uFF1Atr\u1EADn Khe Sanh\u3001\u82F1\uFF1ABattle of Khe Sanh\uFF09\uFF0C\u7F8E\u519B\u4EE3\u53F7\u4E3A\u201C\u82CF\u683C\u5170\u884C\u52A8\u201D\uFF08Operation Scotland\uFF09\u548C\u201C\u98DE\u9A6C\u884C\u52A8\u201D\uFF08Operation Pegasus\uFF09\uFF0C\u662F\u8D8A\u5357\u6218\u4E89\u4E2D\u7206\u53D1\u4E8E\u8D8A\u5357\u5171\u548C\u56FD\uFF08\u5357\u8D8A\uFF09\u5E7F\u6CBB\u7701\u897F\u5317\u90E8\u7684\u4E00\u6B21\u5927\u89C4\u6A21\u6218\u5F79\uFF0C\u65F6\u95F4\u4E3A1968\u5E741\u6708\u52304\u6708\u95F4\u3002\u5728\u6B64\u6218\u5F79\u4E2D\uFF0C\u4E24\u4E2A\u6574\u5E08\u7EA61\u4E077\u5343\u4EBA\u89C4\u6A21\u7684\u8D8A\u5357\u4EBA\u6C11\u519B\u90E8\u961F\u5728\u91CD\u70AE\u3001\u8FEB\u51FB\u70AE\u548C\u706B\u7BAD\u70AE\u652F\u63F4\u4E0B\u731B\u70C8\u56F4\u653B\u4E86\u7531\u4E00\u4E2A\u6574\u7F16\u56E2\u548C\u4E00\u4E2A\u4E34\u65F6\u7EC4\u7F16\u7684\u56E2\u5171\u7EA66\u5343\u4EBA\u548C\u5C0F\u90E8\u8D8A\u5357\u5171\u548C\u56FD\u9646\u519B\u9A7B\u5B88\u7684\u3002 \u6EAA\u751F\u57FA\u5730\u4F4D\u4E8E\u5317\u7EAC17\u5EA6\u5357\u5317\u8D8A\u5206\u754C\u7EBF\u4EE5\u5357\u7EA630\u516C\u91CC\u7684\u4E00\u5904\u9AD8\u5730\uFF0C\u8DDD\u8D8A\u5357-\u8001\u631D\u8FB9\u588319\u516C\u91CC\uFF0C\u8DDD\u8001\u631D\u5883\u5185\u80E1\u5FD7\u660E\u5C0F\u9053\u7684\u6700\u5927\u8FD0\u8F93\u7AD9\u201C\u8F66\u90A6\u201D\u7EA640\u516C\u91CC\u3002\u8D8A\u5357\u4EBA\u6C11\u519B\u4E3B\u8981\u76EE\u7684\u5E0C\u671B\u80FD\u5360\u9886\u8FD9\u4E2A\u57FA\u5730\uFF0C\u4EE5\u6D88\u9664\u5176\u5BF9\u5317\u8D8A\u901A\u5F80\u5357\u8D8A\u8FD0\u8F93\u7EBF\u7684\u5A01\u80C1\uFF1B\u6B21\u8981\u76EE\u7684\u5728\u4E24\u4E2A\u5E08\u8FDB\u653B\u6EAA\u5C71\u57FA\u5730\u7684\u540C\u65F6\uFF0C\u4EE5\u53E6\u4E24\u4E2A\u5E08\u5728\u6EAA\u5C71\u57FA\u5730\u8865\u7ED9\u7EBF9\u53F7\u516C\u8DEF\u8BBE\u4F0F\uFF0C\u8BD5\u56FE\u4F0F\u51FB\u63F4\u519B\uFF0C\u5E0C\u671B\u53D6\u5F97\u6218\u672F\u80DC\u5229\u3002\u56E0\u6B64\u6EAA\u5C71\u6218\u5F79\u6210\u4E3A\u5317\u8D8A\u4EBA\u6C11\u519B\u7EE71965\u5E74\u5FB7\u6D6A\u6CB3\u8C37\u6230\u5F79\u4EE5\u6765\u6700\u5927\u7684\u4E00\u6B21\u4EE5\u6B63\u89C4\u519B\u4E0E\u7F8E\u519B\u6B63\u9762\u4EA4\u950B\u3002 \u7F8E\u519B\u4EE5\u201C\u4E0D\u6210\u4E3A\u53C8\u4E00\u4E2A\u5960\u8FB9\u5E9C\u201D\uFF0C\u901A\u8FC7\u516C\u4F17\u5A92\u4F53\u5411\u56FD\u5185\u9AD8\u8C03\u5BA3\u4F20\u6EAA\u5C71\u6218\u5F79\uFF0C\u5E76\u5B8C\u5168\u4F9D\u9760\u5927\u89C4\u6A21\u7A7A\u4E2D\u8FD0\u8F93\u8865\u5145\u6218\u6597\u4EBA\u5458\u548C\u8865\u7ED9\u575A\u5B88\u57FA\u5730\uFF0C\u4EE5\u53CA\u63D0\u4F9B\u4F18\u52BF\u7A7A\u4E2D\u706B\u529B\u652F\u63F4\u3002\u540C\u65F6\uFF0C\u4E0D\u6025\u4E8E\u4ECE\u9646\u4E0A\u589E\u63F4\u6EAA\u5C71\uFF0C\u800C\u5148\u4EE5\u76F4\u5347\u673A\u673A\u964D\u90E8\u961F\u548C\u5730\u9762\u90E8\u961F\u626B\u8361\u6EAA\u5C71\u57FA\u5730\u5916\u56F4\u7684\u8D8A\u519B\uFF1B\u8D8A\u519B\u4F0F\u51FB\u90E8\u961F\u672A\u80FD\u8FBE\u5230\u4F0F\u51FB\u63F4\u519B\u76EE\u7684\uFF0C\u800C\u4E0E\u7F8E\u519B\u673A\u964D\u90E8\u961F\u548C\u5730\u9762\u90E8\u961F\u6B63\u9762\u4EA4\u6218\uFF0C\u5E76\u5206\u51FA\u7EA66\u5343\u4EBA\u652F\u63F4\u5BF9\u6EAA\u5C71\u7684\u8FDB\u653B\u3002 \u6FC0\u621877\u5929\u540E\uFF0C\u8D8A\u5357\u4EBA\u6C11\u519B\u4ECD\u672A\u80FD\u653B\u4E0B\u6EAA\u5C71\u57FA\u5730\uFF0C\u867D\u6210\u529F\u963B\u622A\u4E86\u7F8E\u519B\u5730\u9762\u589E\u63F4\u90E8\u961F\u8FBE2\u4E2A\u534A\u6708\uFF0C\u5374\u672A\u80FD\u8FBE\u6210\u4F0F\u51FB\u63F4\u519B\u53D6\u5F97\u6218\u672F\u80DC\u5229\u7684\u76EE\u7684\uFF0C\u76F8\u53CD\u4ED8\u51FA\u5927\u91CF\u4F24\u4EA1\uFF1B\u8D8A\u519B\u5728\u7F8E\u519B\u589E\u63F4\u90E8\u961F\u6253\u901A\u5730\u9762\u4EA4\u901A\u7EBF\u524D\u4E3B\u52A8\u9000\u51FA\u6218\u6597\uFF0C\u6539\u56DE\u4EE5\u6E38\u51FB\u6218\u5C0F\u89C4\u6A21\u9891\u7E41\u88AD\u51FB\u6EAA\u5C71\u57FA\u5730\u8865\u7ED9\u7EBF\u3002\u81F37\u6708\uFF0C\u7F8E\u519B\u8BA4\u4E3A\u5DF2\u8FBE\u5230\u4E0D\u6210\u4E3A\u53E6\u4E00\u4E2A\u5960\u8FB9\u5E9C\u7684\u76EE\u7684\uFF1B\u4E14\u81EA4\u6708\u4EE5\u6765\uFF0C\u4E3A\u7EF4\u6301\u6EAA\u5C71\u57FA\u5730\u8865\u7ED9\u7EBF\u4E0E\u8D8A\u519B\u6E38\u51FB\u90E8\u961F\u9891\u7E41\u4EA4\u706B\uFF0C\u4F24\u4EA1\u4E0D\u65AD\uFF1B\u6700\u7EC8\u4E0D\u987E\u575A\u5B88\u6EAA\u5C71\u57FA\u5730\u7684\u6D77\u519B\u9646\u6218\u8FDC\u5F81\u519B\u5B98\u5175\u53CD\u5BF9\uFF0C\u4E5F\u4E3B\u52A8\u653E\u5F03\u4E86\u57FA\u5730\u3002\u7F8E\u519B\u64A4\u9000\u4E2D\u6467\u6BC1\u4E86\u57FA\u5730\uFF0C\u7559\u4E0B\u5E9F\u5F03\u7684\u9AD8\u5730\u88AB\u8D8A\u5357\u4EBA\u6C11\u519B\u5360\u9886\u3002"@zh . "General V\u00F5 Nguy\u00EAn Gi\u00E1p"@en . . . . "American victory in April siege, North Vietnamese victory in July phase :" . "American victory in April siege, North Vietnamese victory in July phase :\n* North Vietnamese Army gained control of the Khe Sanh region after the American withdrawal.\n* Termination of the McNamara Line. North Vietnamese lines of communication were extended further into South Vietnam."@en . . . . . "\u041E\u0441\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u041A\u0445\u0435\u0448\u0430\u043D\u0438 (\u0430\u043D\u0433\u043B. Battle of Khe Sanh) \u2014 \u0441\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0435\u043D\u0438\u0435 \u043C\u0435\u0436\u0434\u0443 \u041D\u0430\u0440\u043E\u0434\u043D\u043E\u0439 \u0430\u0440\u043C\u0438\u0435\u0439 \u0412\u044C\u0435\u0442\u043D\u0430\u043C\u0430 \u0438 \u041A\u043E\u0440\u043F\u0443\u0441\u043E\u043C \u043C\u043E\u0440\u0441\u043A\u043E\u0439 \u043F\u0435\u0445\u043E\u0442\u044B \u0421\u0428\u0410 \u0437\u0430 \u0432\u043E\u0435\u043D\u043D\u0443\u044E \u0431\u0430\u0437\u0443 \u041A\u0445\u0435\u0448\u0430\u043D\u044C (\u041A\u0445\u0435\u0441\u0430\u043D\u044C) \u0432\u043E \u0432\u0440\u0435\u043C\u044F \u0412\u044C\u0435\u0442\u043D\u0430\u043C\u0441\u043A\u043E\u0439 \u0432\u043E\u0439\u043D\u044B. \u041F\u043E \u043E\u0446\u0435\u043D\u043A\u0435 \u0430\u043C\u0435\u0440\u0438\u043A\u0430\u043D\u0441\u043A\u043E\u0439 \u0438\u0441\u0442\u043E\u0440\u0438\u043E\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0444\u0438\u0438, \u043E\u0441\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u041A\u0445\u0435\u0448\u0430\u043D\u0438 \u0441\u0442\u0430\u043B\u0430 \u0441\u0430\u043C\u044B\u043C \u0434\u043E\u043B\u0433\u0438\u043C \u0441\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0435\u043D\u0438\u0435\u043C \u0432\u043E\u0439\u043D\u044B \u0441 \u0443\u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0435\u043C \u0441\u0438\u043B \u0421\u0428\u0410 \u0438 \u0437\u0430\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0448\u0438\u043B\u0430\u0441\u044C \u043F\u043E\u0431\u0435\u0434\u043E\u0439 \u043E\u0431\u043E\u0440\u043E\u043D\u044F\u0432\u0448\u0435\u0439 \u0431\u0430\u0437\u0443 \u043C\u043E\u0440\u0441\u043A\u043E\u0439 \u043F\u0435\u0445\u043E\u0442\u044B. \u041F\u043E\u0437\u0434\u043D\u0435\u0435 \u0431\u0430\u0437\u0430 \u0431\u044B\u043B\u0430 \u043E\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043B\u0435\u043D\u0430, \u0447\u0442\u043E \u043F\u043E\u0437\u0432\u043E\u043B\u0438\u043B\u043E \u0443\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0434\u0430\u0442\u044C \u043E \u0441\u0432\u043E\u0435\u0439 \u043F\u043E\u0431\u0435\u0434\u0435 \u0438 \u0441\u0435\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043E\u0432\u044C\u0435\u0442\u043D\u0430\u043C\u0441\u043A\u043E\u0439 \u0441\u0442\u043E\u0440\u043E\u043D\u0435. \u041E\u0441\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u041A\u0445\u0435\u0448\u0430\u043D\u0438 \u044F\u0432\u043B\u044F\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044F \u043E\u0434\u043D\u0438\u043C \u0438\u0437 \u043D\u0430\u0438\u0431\u043E\u043B\u0435\u0435 \u0438\u0437\u0432\u0435\u0441\u0442\u043D\u044B\u0445 \u0438 \u0437\u043D\u0430\u043A\u043E\u0432\u044B\u0445 \u0441\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0435\u043D\u0438\u0439 \u0412\u044C\u0435\u0442\u043D\u0430\u043C\u0441\u043A\u043E\u0439 \u0432\u043E\u0439\u043D\u044B."@ru . . "The Battle of Khe Sanh (21 January \u2013 9 July 1968) was conducted in the Khe Sanh area of northwestern Qu\u1EA3ng Tr\u1ECB Province, Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), during the Vietnam War. The main US forces defending Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB) were two regiments of the United States Marine Corps supported by elements from the United States Army and the United States Air Force (USAF), as well as a small number of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops. These were pitted against two to three divisional-size elements of the North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). The US command in Saigon initially believed that combat operations around KSCB during 1967 were part of a series of minor PAVN offensives in the border regions. That appraisal was later altered when the PAVN was found to be moving major forces into the area. In response, US forces were built up before the PAVN isolated the Marine base. Once the base came under siege, a series of actions were fought over a period of five months. During this time, KSCB and the hilltop outposts around it were subjected to constant PAVN artillery, mortar, and rocket attacks, and several infantry assaults. To support the Marine base, a massive aerial bombardment campaign (Operation Niagara) was launched by the USAF. Over 100,000 tons of bombs were dropped by US aircraft and over 158,000 artillery rounds were fired in defense of the base. Throughout the campaign, US forces used the latest technology to locate PAVN forces for targeting. Additionally, the logistical effort required to support the base once it was isolated demanded the implementation of other tactical innovations to keep the Marines supplied. In March 1968, an overland relief expedition (Operation Pegasus) was launched by a combined Marine\u2013Army/ARVN task force that eventually broke through to the Marines at Khe Sanh. American commanders considered the defense of Khe Sanh a success, but shortly after the siege was lifted, the decision was made to dismantle the base rather than risk similar battles in the future. On 19 June 1968, the evacuation and destruction of KSCB began. Amid heavy shelling, the Marines attempted to salvage what they could before destroying what remained as they were evacuated. Minor attacks continued before the base was officially closed on 5 July. Marines remained around Hill 689, though, and fighting in the vicinity continued until 11 July until they were finally withdrawn, bringing the battle to a close. In the aftermath, the North Vietnamese proclaimed a victory at Khe Sanh, while US forces claimed that they had withdrawn, as the base was no longer required. Historians have observed that the Battle of Khe Sanh may have distracted American and South Vietnamese attention from the buildup of Viet Cong (VC) forces in the south before the early 1968 Tet Offensive. Nevertheless, the US commander during the battle, General William Westmoreland, maintained that the true intention of Tet was to distract forces from Khe Sanh."@en . "Kingdom of Laos: Unknown.\n\nTotal :\n\n12,000+ casualties"@en . . . "Colonel Cao V\u0103n Kh\u00E1nh"@en . "Schlacht um Khe Sanh"@de . "5 ~ 20 killed, wounded unknown" . "\u30B1\u30B5\u30F3\u306E\u6226\u3044"@ja . . "(Operation Charlie for the final evacuation :)"@en . . . . . . . . . "~6,000 Marines at the Combat Base of Khe Sanh" . . . "Laos" . . "POINT(106.72858428955 16.655445098877)"^^ . . "Major general L\u00EA Quang \u0110\u1EA1o"@en . . "L'assedio di Khe Sanh, o battaglia di Khe Sanh (in inglese Battle of Khe Sanh), o operazione Statale 9 (in vietnamita Chi\u1EBFn d\u1ECBch \u0110\u01B0\u1EDDng 9 - Khe Sanh), fu una lunga battaglia combattuta durante la guerra del Vietnam, dal 21 gennaio al 9 luglio del 1968, per il controllo della base statunitense di Khe Sanh, nella provincia di Quang Tri, Vietnam del Sud. Khe Sanh fu la prima base militare americana ad essere abbandonata sotto pressione del nemico durante il conflitto in Indocina."@it . . . "A Batalha de Khe Sanh foi um conflito armado que ocorreu durante a Guerra do Vietn\u00E3, envolvendo o Ex\u00E9rcito do Vietn\u00E3 do Sul e Ex\u00E9rcito dos Estados Unidos, contra o Ex\u00E9rcito do Povo do Vietn\u00E3 (NVA), a noroeste da prov\u00EDncia de Quang Tri."@pt . . "*Defense at Route 9: ~16,900 (320th and 324th Division)" . . . . . . . . . . "7 missing" . . "\u30B1\u30B5\u30F3\u306E\u6226\u3044\uFF08\u30B1\u30B5\u30F3\u306E\u305F\u305F\u304B\u3044, \u82F1: Battle of Khe Sanh, \u30D9\u30C8\u30CA\u30E0\u8A9E\uFF1AChi\u1EBFn d\u1ECBch \u0110\u01B0\u1EDDng 9 - Khe Sanh / \u6230\u5F79\u58589-\u6EAA\u751F\uFF09\u3068\u306F\u3001\u30D9\u30C8\u30CA\u30E0\u6226\u4E89\u306B\u304A\u3044\u30661968\u5E741\u6708\u4EE5\u964D\u30A2\u30E1\u30EA\u30AB\u8ECD\u3068\u5317\u30D9\u30C8\u30CA\u30E0\u8ECD\u304C\u5357\u5317\u30D9\u30C8\u30CA\u30E0\u9593\u306E\u975E\u6B66\u88C5\u5730\u5E2F\uFF08DMZ\uFF09\u304B\u308925\u30AD\u30ED\u30E1\u30FC\u30C8\u30EB\u5357\u306B\u30A2\u30E1\u30EA\u30AB\u8ECD\u304C\u8A2D\u55B6\u3057\u305F\u30B1\u30B5\u30F3\u6226\u95D8\u57FA\u5730\u3092\u5DE1\u3063\u3066\u7E70\u308A\u5E83\u3052\u305F\u6226\u3044\u3067\u3042\u308B\u3002"@ja . . "(Operation Scotland II (15 April 1968 \u2013 July 1968):)" . "\u0411\u0438\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u041A\u0435-\u0421\u0430\u043D, \u0430\u0431\u043E \u043E\u0431\u043B\u043E\u0433\u0430 \u041A\u0435-\u0421\u0430\u043D (\u041A\u0435\u0441\u0430\u043D\u0456; \u0430\u043D\u0433\u043B. Battle of Khe Sanh, \u0432'\u0454\u0442. Chi\u1EBFn d\u1ECBch \u0110\u01B0\u1EDDng 9 \u2014 Khe Sanh) \u0432\u0456\u0434\u0431\u0443\u043B\u0430\u0441\u044C \u043F\u0456\u0434 \u0447\u0430\u0441 \u0432\u0456\u0439\u043D\u0438 \u0443 \u0412'\u0454\u0442\u043D\u0430\u043C\u0456, \u0442\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0430\u043B\u0430 \u0432\u0456\u0434 21 \u0441\u0456\u0447\u043D\u044F \u0434\u043E 9 \u043B\u0438\u043F\u043D\u044F 1968 \u0440\u043E\u043A\u0443 \u043C\u0456\u0436 \u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438\u043D\u0430\u043C\u0438 26 \u0442\u0430 9 \u043F\u043E\u043B\u043A\u0456\u0432 \u043A\u043E\u0440\u043F\u0443\u0441\u0443 \u043C\u043E\u0440\u0441\u044C\u043A\u043E\u0457 \u043F\u0456\u0445\u043E\u0442\u0438 \u0421\u0428\u0410 \u0442\u0430 304 \u0456 325C-\u0434\u0438\u0432\u0456\u0437\u0456\u044F\u043C\u0438 \u0412'\u0454\u0442\u043D\u0430\u043C\u0441\u044C\u043A\u043E\u0457 \u043D\u0430\u0440\u043E\u0434\u043D\u043E\u0457 \u0430\u0440\u043C\u0456\u0457 (\u0412\u041D\u0410) \u043F\u043E\u0431\u043B\u0438\u0437\u0443 \u0441\u0435\u043B\u0430 . \u0410\u0440\u043C\u0456\u0457 \u041F\u0456\u0432\u043D\u0456\u0447\u043D\u043E\u0433\u043E \u0412'\u0454\u0442\u043D\u0430\u043C\u0443 \u043D\u0435 \u0432\u0434\u0430\u043B\u043E\u0441\u044C \u0437\u0430\u0445\u043E\u043F\u0438\u0442\u0438 \u0431\u0430\u0437\u0443, \u043E\u0431\u043B\u043E\u0433\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0448\u0438\u043B\u0430\u0441\u044C \u0432\u0456\u0439\u0441\u044C\u043A\u043E\u0432\u0438\u043C \u043F\u0440\u043E\u0432\u0430\u043B\u043E\u043C. \u0417 \u0443\u0440\u0430\u0445\u0443\u0432\u0430\u043D\u043D\u044F\u043C \u0432\u0435\u043B\u0438\u043A\u0438\u0445 \u0432\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442 \u0441\u0443\u043F\u0440\u043E\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043D\u0438\u043A\u0430, \u043E\u0431\u043B\u043E\u0433\u0430 \u0437\u0430\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0448\u0438\u043B\u0430\u0441\u044C \u0434\u043B\u044F \u0430\u043C\u0435\u0440\u0438\u043A\u0430\u043D\u0441\u044C\u043A\u043E\u0457 \u0441\u0442\u043E\u0440\u043E\u043D\u0438 \u043F\u0435\u0440\u0435\u043C\u043E\u0433\u043E\u044E. \u0427\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0437 \u0434\u0435\u044F\u043A\u0438\u0439 \u0447\u0430\u0441 \u043F\u043E \u0437\u0430\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0448\u0435\u043D\u043D\u044E \u0431\u0438\u0442\u0432\u0438, \u0431\u0430\u0437\u0430 \u0431\u0443\u043B\u0430 \u043F\u043E\u043A\u0438\u043D\u0443\u0442\u0430 \u0442\u0430 \u0437\u0440\u0443\u0439\u043D\u043E\u0432\u0430\u043D\u0430."@uk . "Pertempuran Khe Sanh terjadi antara tanggal 21 Januari hingga 8 April 1968 pada masa Perang Vietnam antara pasukan Vietnam Utara (Tentara Rakyat Vietnam) melawan US Army. Pada awal perang, markas Amerika di terletak dekat dengan perbatasan Vietnam Utara dan para prajurit yang bermarkas mengirim unit secara gabungan ke perbatasan itu melawan Tentara Rakyat Vietnam dalam . Tahun 1967 ditandai dengan gerakan pasukan Vietnam Utara yang bertambah dramatis dari tahun 1966. Namun, komandan tinggi angkatan Amerika di Vietnam, Jenderal William Westmoreland percaya pada setiap gerakan Amerika yang membingungkan dari banyak perjuangan Viet Cong di Vietnam Selatan. Markas Amerika di Khe Sanh diserang oleh Tentara Rakyat Vietnam pada tanggal 21 Januari 1968 saat serangan Tet, serangan Vietnam Utara at"@in . . "1122460230"^^ . . "2,642 wounded," . "\uCF00\uC0B0 \uC804\uD22C"@ko . . . "730"^^ . "\u6EAA\u751F\u6218\u5F79"@zh . "Bitva o Khe Sanh bylo vojensk\u00E9 st\u0159etnut\u00ED mezi Ameri\u010Dany a Jihovietnamci na jedn\u00E9 stran\u011B a Severovietnamci a Vietkongem na stran\u011B druh\u00E9 b\u011Bhem v\u00E1lky ve Vietnamu. \u0160lo o \u010Dty\u0159m\u011Bs\u00ED\u010Dn\u00ED obl\u00E9h\u00E1n\u00ED z\u00E1kladny americk\u00E9 n\u00E1mo\u0159n\u00ED p\u011Bchoty v v provincii Quang Tri. Ta byla jedna z kl\u00ED\u010Dov\u00FDch z\u00E1kladen, kter\u00E1 u\u017E n\u011Bkolik m\u011Bs\u00EDc\u016F str\u00E1\u017Eila oblast t\u011Bsn\u011B pod demilitarizovanou z\u00F3nou mezi Severn\u00EDm a Ji\u017En\u00EDm Vietnamem. Severovietnamsk\u00E1 arm\u00E1da ji u\u017E n\u011Bkolikr\u00E1t napadla ve snaze z\u00EDskat kontrolu nad silnicemi vedouc\u00EDmi na jih a v\u00FDchod. Severovietnamsk\u00FD gener\u00E1l V\u00F5 Nguy\u00EAn Gi\u00E1p rozhodl o definitivn\u00EDm dobyt\u00EDm z\u00E1kladny, je\u017E m\u011Blo za\u010D\u00EDt po\u010D\u00E1tkem roku 1968. M\u011Blo se tak\u00E9 jednat o odveden\u00ED pozornosti ameri\u010Dan\u016F od oblast\u00ED na jihu, kam m\u011Bla t\u011Bsn\u011B po \u00FAtoku na Khe Sanh sm\u011B\u0159ovat nov\u00E1 severovietnamsk\u00E1 ofenz\u00EDva, pozd\u011Bji zn\u00E1m\u00E1 jako ofenz\u00EDva Tet. Giap zvolil prakticky stejnou taktiku s jakou porazil Francouze v bitv\u011B u Dien Bien Phu v roce 1954. Do t\u00E9 doby nejrozs\u00E1hlej\u0161\u00ED severovietnamsk\u00FD \u00FAtok za\u010Dal mohutn\u00FDm ost\u0159elov\u00E1n\u00EDm 21. ledna 1968. Cel\u00E9 \u010Dty\u0159i m\u011Bs\u00EDce se Severovietnamci sna\u017Eili ovl\u00E1dnout nebo aspo\u0148 siln\u011B poni\u010Dit americkou z\u00E1kladnu. D\u00EDky udr\u017Eov\u00E1n\u00ED leti\u0161t\u011B v\u0161ak Ameri\u010Dan\u00E9 mohli pravideln\u011B pos\u00EDlat do oble\u017Een\u00E9 z\u00E1kladny z\u00E1soby i voj\u00E1ky. Ameri\u010Dan\u00E9 se nav\u00EDc mohli op\u0159\u00EDt o svou jednozna\u010Dnou vzdu\u0161nou p\u0159evahu. Brzy po \u00FAtoku za\u010Dalo masivn\u00ED leteck\u00E9 bombardov\u00E1n\u00ED Giapov\u00FDch v\u00FDchoz\u00EDch pozic. Na z\u00E1kladnu \u00FAto\u010Dily celkem dv\u011B severovietnamsk\u00E9 divize (304. a 325.) o s\u00EDle asi 17 tis\u00EDc mu\u017E\u016F. Ameri\u010Dan\u00E9 zase nav\u00FD\u0161ili obranu z\u00E1kladny z jednoho praporu na dva pluky (asi 6 tis\u00EDc mu\u017E\u016F). Na za\u010D\u00E1tku dubna zah\u00E1jili Ameri\u010Dan\u00E9 jej\u00EDm\u017E v\u00FDsledkem bylo prolomen\u00ED obkl\u00ED\u010Den\u00ED zven\u010D\u00ED. Do operace bylo zapojeno asi 20 tis\u00EDc mu\u017E\u016F - skoro polovina v\u0161ech americk\u00FDch bojov\u00FDch jednotek ve Vietnamu. B\u011Bhem operace Ameri\u010Dan\u00E9 a jejich spojenci utrp\u011Bli ztr\u00E1ty 703 padl\u00FDch, 2 642 ran\u011Bn\u00FDch a 7 nezv\u011Bstn\u00FDch. Severovietnamsk\u00E9 ztr\u00E1ty byly odhadov\u00E1ny na 5 000 mrtv\u00FDch, 13 Vietnamc\u016F bylo zajato. Po prolomen\u00ED obkl\u00ED\u010Den\u00ED Ameri\u010Dan\u00E9 okam\u017Eit\u011B zah\u00E1jili operaci Scotland II - pron\u00E1sledov\u00E1n\u00ED vietnamsk\u00FDch jednotek v oblasti. P\u0159itom utrp\u011Bli skoro dvojn\u00E1sobn\u00E9 ztr\u00E1ty, ne\u017E v dob\u011B oble\u017Een\u00ED Khe Sanhu. Proto\u017Ee v\u0161ak po ofenziv\u011B Tet bylo urychleno stahov\u00E1n\u00ED americk\u00FDch jednotek z Vietnamu, koncem \u010Dervna 1968 byla zah\u00E1jena evakuace pos\u00E1dky Khe Sanh a 15. \u010Dervence 1968 z\u00E1kladnu ovl\u00E1dli voj\u00E1ci Severn\u00EDho Vietnamu. V\u00FDsledek bitvy je dodnes sporn\u00FD[zdroj?], nebo\u0165 ob\u011B strany si n\u00E1rokuj\u00ED v\u00EDt\u011Bzstv\u00ED.[zdroj?] P\u0159edev\u0161\u00EDm nen\u00ED zcela jasn\u00E9, jak\u00FD byl strategick\u00FD z\u00E1m\u011Br Severn\u00EDho Vietnamu, zda dobyt\u00ED z\u00E1kladny a otev\u0159en\u00ED cesty na jih; odl\u00E1k\u00E1n\u00ED pozornosti protivn\u00EDka od ofenzivy Tet, nebo jenom zaji\u0161t\u011Bn\u00ED pohrani\u010Dn\u00ED oblasti p\u0159ed mo\u017En\u00FDm americk\u00FDm \u00FAtokem na Severn\u00ED Vietnam. Zat\u00EDmco americk\u00E9 velen\u00ED zd\u016Fraz\u0148ovalo, \u017Ee Vietnamc\u016Fm se nepoda\u0159ilo zopakovat \u00FAsp\u011Bch Dien Bien Phu, pro vietnamskou stranu je rozhoduj\u00EDc\u00ED, \u017Ee se poda\u0159ilo odl\u00E1kat v\u00FDznamn\u00E9 americk\u00E9 s\u00EDly od hlavn\u00EDho m\u011Bsta Saigonu a skute\u010Dnost, \u017Ee z\u00E1kladna nakonec padla do jej\u00EDch rukou."@cs . "106.7285842895508"^^ . "Pathet Lao" . . . . . "2469"^^ . "Pertempuran Khe Sanh terjadi antara tanggal 21 Januari hingga 8 April 1968 pada masa Perang Vietnam antara pasukan Vietnam Utara (Tentara Rakyat Vietnam) melawan US Army. Pada awal perang, markas Amerika di terletak dekat dengan perbatasan Vietnam Utara dan para prajurit yang bermarkas mengirim unit secara gabungan ke perbatasan itu melawan Tentara Rakyat Vietnam dalam . Tahun 1967 ditandai dengan gerakan pasukan Vietnam Utara yang bertambah dramatis dari tahun 1966. Namun, komandan tinggi angkatan Amerika di Vietnam, Jenderal William Westmoreland percaya pada setiap gerakan Amerika yang membingungkan dari banyak perjuangan Viet Cong di Vietnam Selatan. Markas Amerika di Khe Sanh diserang oleh Tentara Rakyat Vietnam pada tanggal 21 Januari 1968 saat serangan Tet, serangan Vietnam Utara atas Vietnam Selatan. Vietnam Utara awalnya menekan angkatan AS dari garis pertahanan mereka di luar markas hingga markas di mana angkatan AS terus menerus mengadakan serangan. Di awal Februari Vietnam Utara menyerang posis Amerika di selatan Khe Sanh dan berhasil menaklukkannya dan dengan itu Khe Sanh dikepung oleh pasukan Vietnam Utara yang mengadakan serangan tiap hari di markas itu. Vietnam Utara segera mulai mulai menembakkan banyak artileri secara besar-besaran terhadap markas agar menyerah, lebih dari 700.000 granat dari pasukan Vietnam Utara menghantam Khe Sanh. Amerika mengadakan serangan bom besar-besaran dari udara terhadap kedudukan pasukan Vietnam Utara untuk mempertahankan angkatan AS di markas itu. Di akhir Maret markas Amerika masih saja diserang oleh Vietnam Utara. Pada tanggal 1 April AS mengawali yang memecah pengepungan Khe Sanh; operasi tersebut berhasil setelah perlawanan singkat dari pasukan Vietnam Utara yang kelelahan lalu menarik mundur. Pertempuran Khe Sanh menjadi salah satu pertempuran berdarah dan paling diingat dari Perang Vietnam yang saat itu pers AS melaporkan situasi di Khe Sanh tiap hari."@in . "\u30B1\u30B5\u30F3\u306E\u6226\u3044\uFF08\u30B1\u30B5\u30F3\u306E\u305F\u305F\u304B\u3044, \u82F1: Battle of Khe Sanh, \u30D9\u30C8\u30CA\u30E0\u8A9E\uFF1AChi\u1EBFn d\u1ECBch \u0110\u01B0\u1EDDng 9 - Khe Sanh / \u6230\u5F79\u58589-\u6EAA\u751F\uFF09\u3068\u306F\u3001\u30D9\u30C8\u30CA\u30E0\u6226\u4E89\u306B\u304A\u3044\u30661968\u5E741\u6708\u4EE5\u964D\u30A2\u30E1\u30EA\u30AB\u8ECD\u3068\u5317\u30D9\u30C8\u30CA\u30E0\u8ECD\u304C\u5357\u5317\u30D9\u30C8\u30CA\u30E0\u9593\u306E\u975E\u6B66\u88C5\u5730\u5E2F\uFF08DMZ\uFF09\u304B\u308925\u30AD\u30ED\u30E1\u30FC\u30C8\u30EB\u5357\u306B\u30A2\u30E1\u30EA\u30AB\u8ECD\u304C\u8A2D\u55B6\u3057\u305F\u30B1\u30B5\u30F3\u6226\u95D8\u57FA\u5730\u3092\u5DE1\u3063\u3066\u7E70\u308A\u5E83\u3052\u305F\u6226\u3044\u3067\u3042\u308B\u3002"@ja . . . . . "~45,000 in total" . . . . "\u041E\u0431\u043B\u043E\u0433\u0430 \u041A\u0435-\u0421\u0430\u043D"@uk . . . "David E. Lownds"@en . . "Battle of Khe Sanh"@en . "El sitio de Khe Sanh fue una de las batallas m\u00E1s largas y sangrientas de la guerra de Vietnam, tanto por la cantidad de tropas desplazadas como de suministros y equipos que se movilizaron hasta la posici\u00F3n con el objetivo de resistir los ataques."@es . "30 light tanks PT-76" . . . "Bitva o Khe Sanh bylo vojensk\u00E9 st\u0159etnut\u00ED mezi Ameri\u010Dany a Jihovietnamci na jedn\u00E9 stran\u011B a Severovietnamci a Vietkongem na stran\u011B druh\u00E9 b\u011Bhem v\u00E1lky ve Vietnamu. \u0160lo o \u010Dty\u0159m\u011Bs\u00ED\u010Dn\u00ED obl\u00E9h\u00E1n\u00ED z\u00E1kladny americk\u00E9 n\u00E1mo\u0159n\u00ED p\u011Bchoty v v provincii Quang Tri. Ta byla jedna z kl\u00ED\u010Dov\u00FDch z\u00E1kladen, kter\u00E1 u\u017E n\u011Bkolik m\u011Bs\u00EDc\u016F str\u00E1\u017Eila oblast t\u011Bsn\u011B pod demilitarizovanou z\u00F3nou mezi Severn\u00EDm a Ji\u017En\u00EDm Vietnamem. Severovietnamsk\u00E1 arm\u00E1da ji u\u017E n\u011Bkolikr\u00E1t napadla ve snaze z\u00EDskat kontrolu nad silnicemi vedouc\u00EDmi na jih a v\u00FDchod."@cs . "90436"^^ . "L'assedio di Khe Sanh, o battaglia di Khe Sanh (in inglese Battle of Khe Sanh), o operazione Statale 9 (in vietnamita Chi\u1EBFn d\u1ECBch \u0110\u01B0\u1EDDng 9 - Khe Sanh), fu una lunga battaglia combattuta durante la guerra del Vietnam, dal 21 gennaio al 9 luglio del 1968, per il controllo della base statunitense di Khe Sanh, nella provincia di Quang Tri, Vietnam del Sud. Durante la prima fase le forze dell'Esercito Popolare Nordvietnamita tentarono senza successo di distruggere la base, difesa da due reggimenti di marines e da un limitato numero di truppe sudvietnamite. Dopo circa due mesi di assedio, nel marzo del 1968, una spedizione di soccorso (Operazione Pegasus) riusc\u00EC a raggiungere la base rompendo l'accerchiamento nordvietnamita. A partire dall'inizio di giugno, le forze statunitensi si ritirarono in segreto e definitivamente da Khe Sanh. L'Esercito Popolare del Vietnam ottenne il controllo completo della roccaforte. L'assedio termin\u00F2 con un limitato fallimento strategico e tattico per gli Stati Uniti; non fu raggiunto l'obiettivo di \"tenere Khe Sanh a tutti i costi\" come il presidente Johnson aveva richiesto. Inoltre fu vanificata la costruzione in corso della linea di McNamara, una linea minata per controllare le infiltrazioni dal Nord. Khe Sanh fu la prima base militare americana ad essere abbandonata sotto pressione del nemico durante il conflitto in Indocina."@it . . . . "De Slag om Khe Sanh was een 77 dagen durend beleg, uitgevochten rondom de Mariniersbasis Khe Sanh, nabij de gedemilitariseerde zone tussen Noord- en Zuid-Vietnam. Het was een onderdeel van het Tet-offensief, en was een van de eerste conventionele veldslagen tussen de Vietcong en de Amerikaanse strijdkrachten. Hoewel de slag een Amerikaanse overwinning was, besloot men niet lang na de slag om de marinebasis alsnog te verlaten, waardoor de Vietminh de basis en het omliggend gebied kon bezetten. De slag kende de grootste en zwaarste tactische bombardementen in een enkel gebied in de geschiedenis van de oorlogsvoering. Na de slag, zou de Vietminh het nooit meer tegen de Amerikanen opnemen in een conventionele veldslag."@nl . . "ref|Not including ARVN Ranger, RF/PF, Forward Operation Base 3 \u2013 U.S. Army, Royal Laotian Army and SOG commandos losses. The low figure often cited for US casualties (205 killed in action, 443 wounded, 2 missing) does not take into account U.S. Army or Air Force casualties or those incurred during Operation Pegasus.|group=Note"@en . . . . "The Battle of Khe Sanh (21 January \u2013 9 July 1968) was conducted in the Khe Sanh area of northwestern Qu\u1EA3ng Tr\u1ECB Province, Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), during the Vietnam War. The main US forces defending Khe Sanh Combat Base (KSCB) were two regiments of the United States Marine Corps supported by elements from the United States Army and the United States Air Force (USAF), as well as a small number of Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops. These were pitted against two to three divisional-size elements of the North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN)."@en . . . . "300"^^ . . "12,000+ casualties" . "\u041E\u0441\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u041A\u0445\u0435\u0448\u0430\u043D\u0438 (\u0430\u043D\u0433\u043B. Battle of Khe Sanh) \u2014 \u0441\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0435\u043D\u0438\u0435 \u043C\u0435\u0436\u0434\u0443 \u041D\u0430\u0440\u043E\u0434\u043D\u043E\u0439 \u0430\u0440\u043C\u0438\u0435\u0439 \u0412\u044C\u0435\u0442\u043D\u0430\u043C\u0430 \u0438 \u041A\u043E\u0440\u043F\u0443\u0441\u043E\u043C \u043C\u043E\u0440\u0441\u043A\u043E\u0439 \u043F\u0435\u0445\u043E\u0442\u044B \u0421\u0428\u0410 \u0437\u0430 \u0432\u043E\u0435\u043D\u043D\u0443\u044E \u0431\u0430\u0437\u0443 \u041A\u0445\u0435\u0448\u0430\u043D\u044C (\u041A\u0445\u0435\u0441\u0430\u043D\u044C) \u0432\u043E \u0432\u0440\u0435\u043C\u044F \u0412\u044C\u0435\u0442\u043D\u0430\u043C\u0441\u043A\u043E\u0439 \u0432\u043E\u0439\u043D\u044B. \u041F\u043E \u043E\u0446\u0435\u043D\u043A\u0435 \u0430\u043C\u0435\u0440\u0438\u043A\u0430\u043D\u0441\u043A\u043E\u0439 \u0438\u0441\u0442\u043E\u0440\u0438\u043E\u0433\u0440\u0430\u0444\u0438\u0438, \u043E\u0441\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u041A\u0445\u0435\u0448\u0430\u043D\u0438 \u0441\u0442\u0430\u043B\u0430 \u0441\u0430\u043C\u044B\u043C \u0434\u043E\u043B\u0433\u0438\u043C \u0441\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0435\u043D\u0438\u0435\u043C \u0432\u043E\u0439\u043D\u044B \u0441 \u0443\u0447\u0430\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0435\u043C \u0441\u0438\u043B \u0421\u0428\u0410 \u0438 \u0437\u0430\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0448\u0438\u043B\u0430\u0441\u044C \u043F\u043E\u0431\u0435\u0434\u043E\u0439 \u043E\u0431\u043E\u0440\u043E\u043D\u044F\u0432\u0448\u0435\u0439 \u0431\u0430\u0437\u0443 \u043C\u043E\u0440\u0441\u043A\u043E\u0439 \u043F\u0435\u0445\u043E\u0442\u044B. \u041F\u043E\u0437\u0434\u043D\u0435\u0435 \u0431\u0430\u0437\u0430 \u0431\u044B\u043B\u0430 \u043E\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043B\u0435\u043D\u0430, \u0447\u0442\u043E \u043F\u043E\u0437\u0432\u043E\u043B\u0438\u043B\u043E \u0443\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0434\u0430\u0442\u044C \u043E \u0441\u0432\u043E\u0435\u0439 \u043F\u043E\u0431\u0435\u0434\u0435 \u0438 \u0441\u0435\u0432\u0435\u0440\u043E\u0432\u044C\u0435\u0442\u043D\u0430\u043C\u0441\u043A\u043E\u0439 \u0441\u0442\u043E\u0440\u043E\u043D\u0435. \u041E\u0441\u0430\u0434\u0430 \u041A\u0445\u0435\u0448\u0430\u043D\u0438 \u044F\u0432\u043B\u044F\u0435\u0442\u0441\u044F \u043E\u0434\u043D\u0438\u043C \u0438\u0437 \u043D\u0430\u0438\u0431\u043E\u043B\u0435\u0435 \u0438\u0437\u0432\u0435\u0441\u0442\u043D\u044B\u0445 \u0438 \u0437\u043D\u0430\u043A\u043E\u0432\u044B\u0445 \u0441\u0440\u0430\u0436\u0435\u043D\u0438\u0439 \u0412\u044C\u0435\u0442\u043D\u0430\u043C\u0441\u043A\u043E\u0439 \u0432\u043E\u0439\u043D\u044B."@ru . . . . "El sitio de Khe Sanh fue una de las batallas m\u00E1s largas y sangrientas de la guerra de Vietnam, tanto por la cantidad de tropas desplazadas como de suministros y equipos que se movilizaron hasta la posici\u00F3n con el objetivo de resistir los ataques."@es . . . "2541"^^ . . . . . "2,396 wounded" . "Le si\u00E8ge de Khe Sanh est une bataille de la guerre du Vi\u00EAt Nam qui opposa l'arm\u00E9e am\u00E9ricaine \u00E0 l'Arm\u00E9e populaire vietnamienne et les troupes du Front national de lib\u00E9ration du Sud Vi\u00EAt Nam (Vi\u00EAt Cong). Elle se d\u00E9roula au d\u00E9but de 1968, durant la fameuse offensive du T\u1EBFt. Elle commen\u00E7a le 21 janvier et dura 77 jours. Conclue par une victoire am\u00E9ricaine, elle n'eut cependant pas de r\u00E9elle implication strat\u00E9gique."@fr . . . "1 KC-130, 3 C-123" . . . "CIDG losses: 1,000 \u2013 1,500 killed or missing, at least 250 captured (in Lang Vei), wounded unknown" . "485 killed" . . . "Operation Pegasus: ~20,000 (1st Air Cavalry and Marine units)" . . "Operation Pegasus: ~20,000"@en . "U.S. losses:"@en . "\uCF00\uC0B0 \uC804\uD22C(Battle of Khe Sahn, 1968\uB144 1\uC6D4 21\uC77C ~ 1968\uB144 7\uC6D4 9\uC77C)\uC740 1968\uB144 \uBBF8\uAD6D \uD574\uBCD1\uB300 \uACFC \uBD81\uBCA0\uD2B8\uB0A8 \uAD70\uB300\uAC00 \uC5D0\uC11C \uCE58\uB978 \uC804\uD22C\uC774\uB2E4. \uC81C2\uC758 \uB514\uC5D4\uBE44\uC5D4\uD478 \uC804\uD22C\uB85C \uC720\uBA85\uD558\uC600\uB2E4."@ko . "Bitva o Khe Sanh"@cs . . "Assedio di Khe Sanh"@it . "North Vietnamese figures:"@en . . . . . . . . . "Rathvon M. Tompkins"@en . . "U.S. losses:" . "At least 11 marines killed, wounded unknown" . . . . . . . . . . . . "Operation Arc Light and operation Niagara: U.S. Air Forces"@en . "1436"^^ . "Batalha de Khe Sahn"@pt . . . . . . . . . . "1"^^ . . "(At Khe Sanh:)"@en . . "7"^^ . . . "5"^^ . . "(Operation Scotland I & Operation Pegasus :)"@en . . . . . . "Kingdom of Laos: Unknown." . . . . . . "(Operation Charlie for the final evacuation (19 June \u2013 5 July 1968):)" . . . . . . "North Vietnamese claim: ~11,900 killed or wounded ; 197 aircraft, 78 tanks, 46 cannons, 50 ammunition depots destroyed"@en . . . . . "William Westmoreland"@en . . . . "~6,000 Marines at the Combat Base of Khe Sanh"@en . "2396"^^ . . "ARVN losses: 229 killed, 436 wounded"@en . . . . . . . "Slaget vid Khe Sanh"@sv . "Battle of Khe Sanh"@en . . . . . . . . . "* Termination of theMcNamara Line. North Vietnamese lines of communication were extended further into South Vietnam." . . . . . . . . "North Vietnamese claim: ~11,900 killed or wounded (including about 9,000 American soldiers); 197 aircraft, 78 tanks, 46 cannons, 50 ammunition depots destroyed" . . . . "Pertempuran Khe Sanh"@in . "ARVN losses: 229 killed, 436 wounded (not including CIDG, RF/PF and SOG losses)" . "(Operation Scotland I (1 November 1967 \u2013 31 March 1968) & Operation Pegasus ( 1\u201314 April 1968):)" . . . . "CIDG losses: 1,000 \u2013 1,500 killed or missing, at least 250 captured , wounded unknown"@en . . . . . . . . "(During aerial resupply:)" . "Slag om Khe Sanh"@nl . "730 killed" . . ""@en . . . . "(2,800\u20133,500 killed, 9,000+ wounded, 7 missing, 250+ captured)ref|Not including ARVN Ranger, RF/PF, Forward Operation Base 3 \u2013 U.S. Army, Royal Laotian Army and SOG commandos losses. The low figure often cited for US casualties (205 killed in action, 443 wounded, 2 missing) does not take into account U.S. Army or Air Force casualties or those incurred during Operation Pegasus.|group=Note" . . "Pathet Lao"@en . . . "Viet Cong"@en . "--01-21"^^ . . . . . . "16.65544509887695"^^ . "\u6EAA\u751F\u6218\u5F79\uFF08\u8D8A\u5357\u8BED\uFF1Atr\u1EADn Khe Sanh\u3001\u82F1\uFF1ABattle of Khe Sanh\uFF09\uFF0C\u7F8E\u519B\u4EE3\u53F7\u4E3A\u201C\u82CF\u683C\u5170\u884C\u52A8\u201D\uFF08Operation Scotland\uFF09\u548C\u201C\u98DE\u9A6C\u884C\u52A8\u201D\uFF08Operation Pegasus\uFF09\uFF0C\u662F\u8D8A\u5357\u6218\u4E89\u4E2D\u7206\u53D1\u4E8E\u8D8A\u5357\u5171\u548C\u56FD\uFF08\u5357\u8D8A\uFF09\u5E7F\u6CBB\u7701\u897F\u5317\u90E8\u7684\u4E00\u6B21\u5927\u89C4\u6A21\u6218\u5F79\uFF0C\u65F6\u95F4\u4E3A1968\u5E741\u6708\u52304\u6708\u95F4\u3002\u5728\u6B64\u6218\u5F79\u4E2D\uFF0C\u4E24\u4E2A\u6574\u5E08\u7EA61\u4E077\u5343\u4EBA\u89C4\u6A21\u7684\u8D8A\u5357\u4EBA\u6C11\u519B\u90E8\u961F\u5728\u91CD\u70AE\u3001\u8FEB\u51FB\u70AE\u548C\u706B\u7BAD\u70AE\u652F\u63F4\u4E0B\u731B\u70C8\u56F4\u653B\u4E86\u7531\u4E00\u4E2A\u6574\u7F16\u56E2\u548C\u4E00\u4E2A\u4E34\u65F6\u7EC4\u7F16\u7684\u56E2\u5171\u7EA66\u5343\u4EBA\u548C\u5C0F\u90E8\u8D8A\u5357\u5171\u548C\u56FD\u9646\u519B\u9A7B\u5B88\u7684\u3002 \u6EAA\u751F\u57FA\u5730\u4F4D\u4E8E\u5317\u7EAC17\u5EA6\u5357\u5317\u8D8A\u5206\u754C\u7EBF\u4EE5\u5357\u7EA630\u516C\u91CC\u7684\u4E00\u5904\u9AD8\u5730\uFF0C\u8DDD\u8D8A\u5357-\u8001\u631D\u8FB9\u588319\u516C\u91CC\uFF0C\u8DDD\u8001\u631D\u5883\u5185\u80E1\u5FD7\u660E\u5C0F\u9053\u7684\u6700\u5927\u8FD0\u8F93\u7AD9\u201C\u8F66\u90A6\u201D\u7EA640\u516C\u91CC\u3002\u8D8A\u5357\u4EBA\u6C11\u519B\u4E3B\u8981\u76EE\u7684\u5E0C\u671B\u80FD\u5360\u9886\u8FD9\u4E2A\u57FA\u5730\uFF0C\u4EE5\u6D88\u9664\u5176\u5BF9\u5317\u8D8A\u901A\u5F80\u5357\u8D8A\u8FD0\u8F93\u7EBF\u7684\u5A01\u80C1\uFF1B\u6B21\u8981\u76EE\u7684\u5728\u4E24\u4E2A\u5E08\u8FDB\u653B\u6EAA\u5C71\u57FA\u5730\u7684\u540C\u65F6\uFF0C\u4EE5\u53E6\u4E24\u4E2A\u5E08\u5728\u6EAA\u5C71\u57FA\u5730\u8865\u7ED9\u7EBF9\u53F7\u516C\u8DEF\u8BBE\u4F0F\uFF0C\u8BD5\u56FE\u4F0F\u51FB\u63F4\u519B\uFF0C\u5E0C\u671B\u53D6\u5F97\u6218\u672F\u80DC\u5229\u3002\u56E0\u6B64\u6EAA\u5C71\u6218\u5F79\u6210\u4E3A\u5317\u8D8A\u4EBA\u6C11\u519B\u7EE71965\u5E74\u5FB7\u6D6A\u6CB3\u8C37\u6230\u5F79\u4EE5\u6765\u6700\u5927\u7684\u4E00\u6B21\u4EE5\u6B63\u89C4\u519B\u4E0E\u7F8E\u519B\u6B63\u9762\u4EA4\u950B\u3002 \u7F8E\u519B\u4EE5\u201C\u4E0D\u6210\u4E3A\u53C8\u4E00\u4E2A\u5960\u8FB9\u5E9C\u201D\uFF0C\u901A\u8FC7\u516C\u4F17\u5A92\u4F53\u5411\u56FD\u5185\u9AD8\u8C03\u5BA3\u4F20\u6EAA\u5C71\u6218\u5F79\uFF0C\u5E76\u5B8C\u5168\u4F9D\u9760\u5927\u89C4\u6A21\u7A7A\u4E2D\u8FD0\u8F93\u8865\u5145\u6218\u6597\u4EBA\u5458\u548C\u8865\u7ED9\u575A\u5B88\u57FA\u5730\uFF0C\u4EE5\u53CA\u63D0\u4F9B\u4F18\u52BF\u7A7A\u4E2D\u706B\u529B\u652F\u63F4\u3002\u540C\u65F6\uFF0C\u4E0D\u6025\u4E8E\u4ECE\u9646\u4E0A\u589E\u63F4\u6EAA\u5C71\uFF0C\u800C\u5148\u4EE5\u76F4\u5347\u673A\u673A\u964D\u90E8\u961F\u548C\u5730\u9762\u90E8\u961F\u626B\u8361\u6EAA\u5C71\u57FA\u5730\u5916\u56F4\u7684\u8D8A\u519B\uFF1B\u8D8A\u519B\u4F0F\u51FB\u90E8\u961F\u672A\u80FD\u8FBE\u5230\u4F0F\u51FB\u63F4\u519B\u76EE\u7684\uFF0C\u800C\u4E0E\u7F8E\u519B\u673A\u964D\u90E8\u961F\u548C\u5730\u9762\u90E8\u961F\u6B63\u9762\u4EA4\u6218\uFF0C\u5E76\u5206\u51FA\u7EA66\u5343\u4EBA\u652F\u63F4\u5BF9\u6EAA\u5C71\u7684\u8FDB\u653B\u3002"@zh . . . . . "2,541 wounded (not including ARVN Ranger, RF/PF, Forward Operation Base 3 \u2013 US Army and Royal Laotian Army losses)" . . . . . . . . "Die Schlacht um Khe Sanh, auch Belagerung von Khe Sanh, fand w\u00E4hrend des Vietnamkriegs im Zeitraum vom 21. Januar bis zum 9. Juli 1968 zwischen Teilen des 26. und 9. Regiments des United States Marine Corps und der 304. und 325C-Division der Vietnamesischen Volksarmee in Khe Sanh, Vietnam, statt. Khe Sanh (offizielle Bezeichnung: Khe Sanh Combat Base) war eine Basis der Marines in S\u00FCdvietnam, unweit der laotischen Grenze in der Provinz Qu\u1EA3ng Tr\u1ECB, s\u00FCdlich der entmilitarisierten Zone zu Nordvietnam. Neben der Tet-Offensive und der Schlacht um Hu\u1EBF gilt die Belagerung von Khe Sanh als eine der wichtigsten Milit\u00E4roperationen w\u00E4hrend des Vietnamkriegs. Die Belagerung endete, ohne dass die Basis von den Nordvietnamesen eingenommen werden konnte. Da diese auch die gr\u00F6\u00DFeren Verluste erlitten, wurde die Schlacht seitens der USA als Sieg proklamiert. Allerdings wurde das Milit\u00E4rlager nach der Schlacht von den Amerikanern aufgegeben und zur\u00FCckgebaut; das strategische Ziel der USA, die Grenze zwischen Nord- und S\u00FCdvietnam durch eine Reihe schwer befestigter Stellungen abzuriegeln, hatte sich als undurchf\u00FChrbar erwiesen. Insofern war Khe Sanh ein taktischer Sieg der USA \u2013 aber eine strategische Niederlage."@de . . . . . "30"^^ . "*Siege at Khe Sanh: ~17,200 (304th and 308th Division)" . . . "A Batalha de Khe Sanh foi um conflito armado que ocorreu durante a Guerra do Vietn\u00E3, envolvendo o Ex\u00E9rcito do Vietn\u00E3 do Sul e Ex\u00E9rcito dos Estados Unidos, contra o Ex\u00E9rcito do Povo do Vietn\u00E3 (NVA), a noroeste da prov\u00EDncia de Quang Tri."@pt . . . . "~45,000 in total"@en . . . . . . . . . . . "(At Khe Sanh:)" . "Slaget vid Khe Sanh var ett slag som utspelade sig i Sydvietnam fr\u00E5n den 21 januari till den 8 april 1968 under Vietnamkriget mellan den Nordvietnamesiska arm\u00E9n (NVA) och amerikanska arm\u00E9n. Den amerikanska basen vid l\u00E5g vid under b\u00F6rjan av kriget mycket n\u00E4ra den nordvietnamesiska och Laotiska gr\u00E4nsen och basens soldater s\u00E4ndes regelbundet ut i strid mot NVA f\u00F6rband l\u00E4ngs med gr\u00E4nsen i de s\u00E5 kallade , i syfte att st\u00F6ra eller stoppa fl\u00F6det av regulj\u00E4ra nordvietnamesiska f\u00F6rband in i Sydvietnam. Under 1967 kunde amerikanerna konstatera truppkoncentrationer runt Khe Sanh, med tv\u00E5 nordvietnamesiska infanteridivisioner och underst\u00F6dsf\u00F6rband (304 och 325C divisionerna, sammanlagt runt 40 000 soldater, varav runt 20 000 ber\u00E4knas ha faktiskt medverkat i de f\u00F6ljande striderna) fanns grupperade inom"@sv . "~40,000 in total, in which:" . . . . . "Laos"@en . . . . . "Die Schlacht um Khe Sanh, auch Belagerung von Khe Sanh, fand w\u00E4hrend des Vietnamkriegs im Zeitraum vom 21. Januar bis zum 9. Juli 1968 zwischen Teilen des 26. und 9. Regiments des United States Marine Corps und der 304. und 325C-Division der Vietnamesischen Volksarmee in Khe Sanh, Vietnam, statt. Khe Sanh (offizielle Bezeichnung: Khe Sanh Combat Base) war eine Basis der Marines in S\u00FCdvietnam, unweit der laotischen Grenze in der Provinz Qu\u1EA3ng Tr\u1ECB, s\u00FCdlich der entmilitarisierten Zone zu Nordvietnam. Neben der Tet-Offensive und der Schlacht um Hu\u1EBF gilt die Belagerung von Khe Sanh als eine der wichtigsten Milit\u00E4roperationen w\u00E4hrend des Vietnamkriegs. Die Belagerung endete, ohne dass die Basis von den Nordvietnamesen eingenommen werden konnte. Da diese auch die gr\u00F6\u00DFeren Verluste erlitten, wurde"@de . "Sitio de Khe Sanh"@es . .